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Many authors have highlighted the need to look at the political economy of surveillance and control in 
order to provide a comprehensive picture of the driving motives and ideas behind our increasingly 
surveilled societies. Such analyses have tended to privilege consumption, the material interaction between 
public and private actors and the formal relationships between markets, technologies, policy and politics, 
leaving out a broader understanding of the motives and expectations that are taking shape alongside the 
increase of surveillance and control mechanisms. Moreover, authors have tended to explain surveillance 
as a technology with social consequences (see, among others, Lyon 1994). 
 
The aim of this piece is to approach and elaborate on the experience of an up-and-coming, ‘wannabe’ 
global city, Barcelona, with CCTV in open, public spaces, in light of the literature on this issue, and to 
explore what local dynamics can tell us about the specifics of the interaction between institutional 
settings, political processes, financial interests and social concerns. 
 
2. CCTV in Barcelona 
 
In 2001, Barcelona installed its first 2-camera CCTV system, along Carrer Escudellers (with one camera 
on the corner of La Rambla and the other, ironically, on the corner with Plaça George Orwell). That was 
supposed to be a pilot project, and those who promoted it insisted (then and now) that CCTV was never 
meant to become a widespread solution to Barcelona’s crime and incivility problems.1 However, the 
impact of those devices was never evaluated,2 and the figures for the whole central area of Barcelona do 
not show a significant, sustained increase or decrease of illegal or anti-social activity.3 
 
Even so, in 2003 the system was expanded to Carrer Princesa with the addition of two more cameras, and 
to tourist-filled La Rambla in 2009, with 16 more devices (costing a little less than 10,000 euros each). 
Finally, just recently, video surveillance left the city centre for the first time, and the independent 
Commission which approves the installation of police-monitored CCTV agreed to authorize more 
cameras in Poblenou, at the recently-built Parc del Fòrum, and the Northern district of Sant Andreu. 
                                                      
1 Interview with Barcelona's Councilor for Community Safety (April 2010). 
2 Despite the requests by the CCDVC, which kept asking for information on the use of footage and data on crime in the area. The 
city's police, however, only keeps data at the neighbourhood level, and therefore an evaluation of the impact of the cameras 
where they are located is just impossible, even retroactively. 
3 According to the data provided by the police in the annual requests to renew each CCTV system. We can’t take these figures as 
indicative of the impact of CCTV, however, as they do not specify the limits of the area where the data comes from. 
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Figure 1. George Orwell Square (taken by Clive Norris) 
 
 
Today, as in 2001, the driving force behind the expansion of CCTV in Barcelona is the governing 
Socialist Party (PSC), recently joined by the conservatives (Partit Popular, PP) and the conservative 
nationalists (Convergència i Unió, CiU), who, since 2006, have included video surveillance in their 
political programs and security discourse. This is despite the fact that even in 2001 they criticized the 
decision to monitor public space through surveillance, arguing then that the local government was only 
promoting it to save on police units4 and questioning the legality and impact on crime of the devices.5  
 
But how has CCTV and the idea that there is a need to monitor public space made it to the institutional 
agenda? What are the imaginaries that wrap up the political process at the local level? In the case of 
Barcelona, it is hard to come up with a narrative that explains the reasons sustaining surveillance as a 
policy solution to security concerns by just looking at CCTV. The proliferation of public surveillance in 
open places is definitely accelerating, but at a rate that would appear insignificant to anyone living in 
almost any other European capital. Moreover, CCTV has not been enthusiastically adopted by any 
political party: the conservatives (PP) have embraced it, but have never proposed it as a generalized 
solution to security problems; and the socialists, while leading most local initiatives to install CCTV, are 
still openly critical of it when in the opposition in local City Councils.6 None of the major parties, 
therefore, has provided surveillance with a legitimizing rhetoric, as would be the case of New Labour in 
the UK and Sarkozy’s UMP in France. 
                                                      
4  Minutes of the local Plenary Session, 24/07/09. 
5  Questions submitted to the Socialist mayor by the conservative nationalists (CiU) on 05/07/10, 23/01/02, 08/03/02 and 
25/10/05. 
6  In Valencia, for instance, the local Socialist Party threatened to sue the conservative government for its plan to install cameras 
in public areas. 
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A look at the political and media debates of the last 15 years, however, does provide a bigger picture with 
clues to understanding how and why CCTV has become an increasingly popular policy solution to 
security problems in urban environments: as part of a broader project to promote ‘civility’ and eliminate 
‘anti-social behaviour’.7 The need to impose ‘proper behaviour’ and sanction deviance is the discourse 
used to justify and legitimize the need to control what people do in open, public space through the 
electronic lens –as well as an increased police presence and powers. 
 
Therefore, surveillance, on its own, does not have outspoken policy entrepreneurs either at the local or 
national level. Likewise, it is hard to find big economic interests actors lobbying public bodies to buy 
video-surveillance cameras. In Spain, the CCTV industry is highly atomized, and it is usually small, 
family-run companies (and even individual engineers with strong ties to relevant public figures) that get 
the contracts to install CCTV at the local level. Therefore, if there is an economic motive behind CCTV, 
it cannot be found on the profit to be made from the handful of devices being installed every year.8 
 
But if it is impossible to find public or private actors that are passionate about CCTV, and nobody is 
making tons of money with it, why does it seem so difficult to stop or question the proliferation of 
surveillance technology? 
 
3. Local political pressures, global economic imperatives 
 
While CCTV might make little sense as an immediate political strategy or economic solution, seeing it in 
the framework of the civility drive mentioned before allows us to explore less apparent explanations and 
rationales. In the context of a generalized crisis of legitimacy of political parties, a longstanding embrace 
of punitive populism9 and an increased pressure from far-right parties at the local level,10 CCTV is used to 
convey the idea that government is ‘doing something’ about crime and incivility (Garland 2001). It is, 
therefore, an electoral tool, even if, in the case of Barcelona, a close look at the adoption of security and 
CCTV as an electoral strategy provides a complex picture that casts doubts on its usefulness: the last two 
Socialist mayors embraced surveillance and law and order at moments of acute political crisis, both 
internal and external, and only after trying other strategies, like big events (Fòrum de les Cultures in 
2003, Winter Olympic Games in 2009) in the hope of recreating the success of the 1992 Olympics and 
attempts to promote an image of closeness to the population, participation, and sensitivity to citizens’ 
needs. Interestingly enough, Socialist Mayor Joan Clos promoted Barcelona’s Civility Ordinance and 
expanded the city’s CCTV system in 2003, but by the time the Ordinance was passed and the cameras 
installed, he was politically irrelevant and did not run for office in 2007. In a disturbingly similar turn of 
events, the ‘security turn’ announced by the current Socialist mayor, Jordi Hereu, is likely to be his last 
major decision before losing the support of his own party (not to mention the electorate). 
 
This local political pressure to ‘do something’ in a context of a widening gap between citizens and elected 
officials, however, is only one side of the coin. The discourse around civility and surveillance, which 
effectively make up the broader security discourse at the local level, is not only a way to sell political 
alternatives to the electorate, but also a marketing tool used by the city both to fulfil the demands of the 
corporate sector and to compete at the global level (Cochrane 2007). 
 
The political economy of surveillance, then, resides less with the immediate profits to be made from 
establishing surveillance devices as consumer products than with a broader economic project linked to 
                                                      
7  These range from peeing and swindling to begging, prostitution, skating, leafleting, playing ball and painting graffiti, among 
other activities which the police can impose fines for since 2006. 
8  Note that we are talking about public CCTV in open spaces. Private CCTV and CCTV in public transport would be a different 
matter. 
9  The Spanish Penal Code has been reformed 25 times in the last 15 years. 
10  The far-right (allegedly racist and xenophobic) Plataforma per Catalunya is currently represented in 7 Catalan towns, and has 
led the recent debate on the banning of the burqa. 
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turning urban spaces in spaces of investment and profit. The fact that Barcelona (Spain) has so far only 
installed CCTV systems in the city centre, in areas used intensively by tourists, reveals a picture that takes 
the economic rationale of surveillance beyond the corporation-meets-public-official discourse, which 
highlights private profit and the role of lobbies and lobbyists as a key reason behind the ascendance of 
surveillance technologies in public spaces, and addresses instead a more complex setting, where the 
electoral expectations of local politicians meet the economic interest of the private shop owner meet the 
political aspirations of local media moguls meet the pressure to sell safe cities in the context of a global 
drive to see security technology and surveillance as the solution to all urban evils (and fast track to 
winning elections). 
 
This context could explain the lack of concern about the actual effectiveness of CCTV, and the emphasis 
on its symbolic (deterring) impact. The real driving motives behind CCTV would seem to be related to 
particular political aspirations and a public-private interest in adding the ‘safe’ tag to the wrapping of the 
city as a global product, not fighting crime. After all, it is the visibility of anti-social behaviour, and not 
its impact on objective community safety, that has contributed to making it such a priority in local 
political agendas (Wacquant 2009). In the same way, the visibility of the cameras as a policy choice 




At the beginning of this paper, the tendency to understand surveillance as a technology with social 
consequences was mentioned. This tentative dive in the concrete aspects of the political economy of 
surveillance as a policy process and alternative in the Spanish context would suggest the usefulness of 
exploring an approach that takes surveillance as a political and social process with technological 
consequences, embedded in a global drive to provide ‘safe’ urban environments for business, high-end 
tourism and an investment-attracting ‘creative class’. This is the imaginary that is wrapping up the urge to 
eliminate deviance and unpredictability from the city center. 
 
In this sense, I would argue for the need to understand surveillance in the broader context of urban policy 
and urban regimes, exploring the role it is playing in local political environments, as a last resort for 
drowning politicians and political parties; and at the global level, as part of the must-have check list for 
any city striving to make it to the map of up-and-coming global economic hubs (Logan and Molotch 
1988).  
 
The resulting picture will probably be one of power, uncritical policy-transfer, fear and contradiction. Not 
pretty, but maybe useful in terms of identifying weak links in the policy chain.  
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